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We analyze the welfare multipliers of public spending—the consumption equivalent change in 
welfare for a one dollar change in public spending—in a DSGE model. The welfare multiplier
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capital, as shown by earlier studies, but also on the depreciation rate of public capital and the 
efficiency of public investment defined as a fraction of public investment spending that 
translates into the public capital stock. When the key parameter values are set based on the 
empirical estimates for advanced economies and the output multipliers are consistent with the 
empirical estimates, the welfare multiplier is positive and sizable. The welfare multiplier is 
roughly zero when the key parameter values are set to match the features of developing 
economies. A public infrastructure push in advanced economies makes sense, but developing 
economies should enhance the efficiency and productivity of public investment. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The growth and welfare implications of a public investment push is often a topic of discussion 
in the academic and policy arena. The IMF (2014), for example, argued that in an environment 
of low government borrowing costs, and given concerns about the impact of infrastructure 
bottlenecks on potential and near-term growth, a public infrastructure push might be warranted 
in several countries. Using both cross-country estimates and model simulations, the IMF 
(2014) concludes that a public investment push raises output in both the short and long term, 
particularly during periods of economic slack and monetary accommodation. 
 
In Europe, the “Juncker” investment plan launched by the Commission and the European 
Investment Bank (EIB) aims at increasing public investment by at least 315 billion euros in 
the medium term. In Japan, a large part of fiscal stimulus under the so-called “second arrow” 
of Abenomics is earmarked for infrastructure projects. Public investment is often viewed as an 
important catalyst for economic development. Against this background, it is important to 
evaluate the consequences of public investment. In the existing literature, this has been done 
primarily by focusing on the implications for output. For instance, Baxter and King (1993) 
show that the output effects of public investment depend on the output elasticity of public 
capital, the responsiveness of output to a change in the stock of public capital. 
 
Rioja (1999) shows that a rise in public investment has a positive effect on welfare, which 
depends on private consumption and leisure. The higher the output elasticity of public capital, 
the higher the welfare gain of public investment. Bom and Ligthart (2014) find that the welfare 
effect of a permanent increase in public investment is positive in the long term if the output 
elasticity of public capital exceeds the public investment to GDP ratio, which averages roughly 
3 percent in OECD countries. Sims and Wolff (2018) find that the welfare multiplier of fiscal 
policy—defined as the consumption equivalent change in welfare for one dollar change in 
public spending—is positive. The welfare multiplier, however, becomes negative when the 
output elasticity of public capital is low. 
 
A key limitation of Baxter and King (1993), Rioja (1999), Bom and Ligthart (2014), and Sims 
and Wolff (2018) is that the efficiency of public investment, defined as a fraction of public 
investment spending that translates into the public capital stock, is perfect, so that one dollar 
of public investment spending translates into one dollar of public capital. Prichett (2000) 
criticizes the standard version of public capital accumulation where every dollar of public 
investment spending creates valuable public capital. He finds that the inefficiency of public 
investment is a serious issue in developing countries. Berg et al. (2019) argue first that a 
fraction of public investment spending may be wasted as the public investment project costs 
are higher than they need to be. Second, a fraction of public investment spending may go to 
corruption. Third, bad project selection means that the public sector may choose projects that 
produce a low capital services flow. Several empirical studies support the view that there are 
 3 
significant inefficiencies in public investment (Caselli 2005, Dabla-Norris et al. 2012, Gupta 
et al. 2014, IMF 2015). Gupta et al. (2014) estimate that only half of public investment 
spending translates into public capital in low and middle income countries. The implications 
of the efficiency of public investment using long-term economic growth models has been 
analyzed (Berg et al. 2019, Agenor 2010); in macro models its implications for the conduct 
and transmission of fiscal policy is left unexplored. Dabla-Norris et al. (2012, 240) argue that 
“incorporating PIMI [public investment efficiency] into macro models of development is a 
notable avenue of future research that is likely to generate new knowledge and inform the 
policy debate.” 
 
The main contribution of this paper is to examine the implications of the efficiency of public 
investment for the output and welfare multiplier of fiscal policy in a New Keynesian DSGE 
model. We follow the idea of Prichett (2000) that only a fraction of public investment spending 
translates into the stock of public capital. The focus on welfare is inspired by Mankiw and 
Weinzierl (2011), who show that the “bang for the buck” calculations—by how much output 
increases for one dollar of public spending—are misleading in assessing the welfare effects of 
fiscal policy, because they ignore the composition of GDP. Similarly, Sims and Wolff (2018) 
conclude that the output multiplier may be a poor measure of the welfare effects of fiscal 
policy. 
 
The first main finding is that the welfare multiplier of public investment depends crucially on 
public investment efficiency, the output elasticity of public capital, and the depreciation rate 
of public capital. Public investment efficiency determines the extent to which public 
investment spending increases the public capital stock. The smaller the efficiency of public 
investment, the smaller the supply-side effect of fiscal policy. Consequently, the welfare 
multiplier is increasing in public investment efficiency. This finding is new since the existing 
studies contain no analyses of the implications of public investment efficiency for the welfare 
effects of public investment. The depreciation rate of public capital also affects the stock of 
public capital. The shorter the life spans of public capital, the smaller the welfare multiplier. 
In addition, the larger the output elasticity of public capital, the higher the welfare multiplier, 
because the supply-side effect of fiscal policy depends on the output elasticity of public capital. 
This result is consistent with earlier studies (Rioja 1999, Bom and Ligthart 2014, and Sims and 
Wolff 2018). 
  
The second main finding is that the welfare multiplier of public investment is positive—and 
sizable—in cases where the parameter values of the key variables derive from the empirical 
estimates for advanced economies. The IMF (2015) estimates the annual public capital 
depreciation rate is 5% and the average efficiency gap in public investment is 13% in advanced 
economies. We set the efficiency of public investment at 0.87, which implies that one dollar 
of public investment translates into 0.87 dollars of public capital. Bom and Ligthart’s (2013) 
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meta-analysis concludes that the output elasticity of public capital is 0.083. With these 
numbers, the cumulative output multiplier of fiscal policy over five years is 1.5. This is 
perfectly in line with the empirical estimate of the IMF (2014), which lends credibility to the 
welfare analysis. The welfare multiplier is 1.4: A one dollar increase in public investment 
yields a welfare gain corresponding to a 1.4 dollar increase in private consumption or, 
alternatively interpreted, that households are willing to pay 1.4 dollars for a one dollar rise in 
public investment spending. The gains in productivity linked to enhanced public capital imply 
an increase in private consumption without an identical increase in labor supply. The policy 
implication for advanced economies is that a public investment push is desirable from a welfare 
point of view. Our finding is in line with Sims and Wolff (2018). However, our welfare 
multiplier is much higher than theirs, as discussed below. 
 
The third main finding—and the most prominent—is that the welfare multiplier of public 
investment is likely to be roughly zero in developing economies. Taking into account the 
inefficiency of public investment is more important in developing economies, where low 
efficiency is more serious problem. We set the efficiency of public investment for developing 
economies at 0.57, which is the average of the estimates of Dabla-Norris (2012), Gupta et al. 
(2014), and the IMF (2015). The output elasticity of public capital may be lower in developing 
economies (Bom and Ligthart 2013) and we set it at 4%. With these numbers, together with 
the annual public capital depreciation rate 5%, the welfare multiplier of public investment is 
0.039. This finding is new as the existing literature contains no analysis of the welfare 
multiplier of public investment in developing economies. The cumulative output multiplier 
over five years is 0.76, consistent with the IMF’s (2014) empirical evidence for developing 
economies. We also find that a low public investment efficiency lowers the output multiplier 
of fiscal policy. This is consistent with the IMF’s (2014) finding that public investment has a 
smaller growth effect in low-efficiency countries. Our calculation shows that if all low and 
middle income countries improve the efficiency of public investment from 0.57 to 0.73 (the 
IMF’s 2015 estimate for emerging economies), holding the level of public investment constant, 
this will boost the annual GDP of low and middle income countries by 522 billion U.S. dollars 
in ten years. Potential gains from an improvement in public investment efficiency are thus 
considerable for developing economies. 
 
The policy implications of low public investment efficiency are debated. Pritchett (2000) 
claims that low public investment efficiency in developing countries is problematic, because 
public investment has a weak effect on economic performance. The IMF (2014) argues that 
for this reason low-efficiency countries should raise public investment efficiency. On the other 
hand, Berg et al. (2019) claim since the efficiency and scarcity of public capital are inversely 
related across countries in theoretical growth models, the productivity (output elasticity) of 
public capital is higher in low-efficiency countries. Therefore, the output effect of public 
investment is at least identical in low-efficiency countries. Our paper offers a different 
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perspective on this debate. First, the IMF (2014) finds that the output multiplier of public 
investment in advanced economies is double that of developing economies. Second, the IMF 
(2015) shows that the efficiency of public investment is much higher in advanced economies 
than developing economies. In a DSGE model, these two findings cannot be reconciled without 
assuming less public capital productivity in developing countries. Both the efficiency and 
productivity of public investment are thus likely to be lower in developing countries and they 
may both be so low that the welfare multiplier of public investment is roughly zero. Developing 
economies should raise the efficiency and productivity of public investment. 
 
The fourth main finding of our paper is that a fraction of the welfare gains of public investment 
leaks abroad. Sims and Wolff (2018), who use a closed-economy model of the U.S with full 
public investment efficiency, is the only paper analyzing the welfare multiplier of public 
investment. Their welfare multiplier is 0.3. In Sims and Wolff (2018), the (domestic) welfare 
multiplier takes all welfare effects into account. In open economies, a fiscal expansion raises 
the demand for foreign goods, increasing foreign income, and the improvement of the foreign 
terms of trade increases foreign consumption. The positive welfare spillover effect implies that 
the (domestic) welfare multiplier is smaller than the world welfare multiplier. In our model, 
the world welfare multiplier, using the parameterization of Sims and Wolff (2018), is 0.3. This 
is fully consistent with Sims and Wolff (2018). However, our (domestic) welfare multiplier is 
only 0.2, so that roughly one third of the overall welfare gain leaks abroad. However, Sims and 
Wolff (2018) may underestimate the welfare gains of public investment, even if they assume 
full public investment efficiency and use a closed-economy model. First, they set the 
productivity of public capital at 5%; according to the meta-analysis by Bom and Ligthart 
(2013) it is 8%. Second, they set the annual depreciation rate at 10%; according to the IMF 
(2015) it is 5%. Therefore, our welfare multiplier of choice (1.4) is roughly four times that of 
Sims and Wolff (2018). 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 
discusses the parameterization. Section 4 analyzes the output and welfare multipliers of fiscal 
policy. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2 MODEL 
There are two countries in the world, which we label home and foreign. The world population 
is normalized to one and there is a continuum of firms and households indexed by 𝑧 ∈ [0,1]. 
A fraction n (1-n) of households and firms are domestic (foreign). We look at two kinds of 
public spending: consumption and investment. 
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2.1 Demand Side: Households 
All households have identical preferences. The utility function of the representative domestic 
household is given by 
 
𝑈 = ∑ 𝛽 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐶 −
( )
+ 𝜗𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐺 ,  (1) 
 
where 0 < 𝛽 < 1 is the discount factor, Ct is a private consumption index, 𝑙 (𝑧) is the 
household’s labor supply, 𝜈 is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, 𝐺  is a public consumption 
index, and 𝜗 is the weight of public consumption relative to private consumption.  
 
The private consumption index is defined as 
 
𝐶 = [𝑛𝛼 𝐶 + (1 − 𝑛𝛼) 𝐶 ] , 
 
where 𝐶  (𝐶 ) is an index of domestic (foreign) goods and ρ > 0 is the elasticity of substitution 
between domestic and foreign goods (cross-country substitutability). In this setup, 𝑛𝛼(0 <
𝑛𝛼 < 1) is the proportion of domestic goods in the consumption basket, and the parameter α 
>1 captures the degree of home bias in consumption. The public consumption indexes are 
identical to the private consumption ones. In addition, an analogous index governs public 
infrastructure spending. The consumption of domestic and foreign goods 𝐶 and 𝐶 are 
aggregates defined as follows  
 
𝐶 = [𝑛 ∫ (𝑐 (𝑧)) 𝑑𝑧] , 𝐶 = [(1 − 𝑛) ∫ (𝑐 (𝑧)) 𝑑𝑧] , 
 
where 𝑐 (𝑧) (𝑐 (z)) is the consumption of differentiated domestic (foreign) good z by the 
representative domestic household, and θ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between two goods 
produced in the same country (within-country substitutability). 
 




(𝐶∗ ) + (1 − 𝑛𝛼∗) (𝐶
∗
) ] , 
 
where asterisks indicate consumption by the representative foreign household, and n𝛼∗ 
(0 < 𝑛𝛼∗ < 1) is the proportion of domestic goods in the foreign consumption basket. We 
assume home bias in consumption, requiring α* < 1. 
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Given the consumption indexes, the private demand functions for the differentiated domestic 





















The public demand functions for the domestic and foreign goods by domestic and foreign 
governments are defined in an analogous way. In these demand functions, 𝑝 (𝑧) and 𝑝 (𝑧) 
denote the domestic currency price of domestic and foreign goods, respectively, while 𝑃  and 
𝑃 are the price indexes that correspond to domestic and foreign aggregate consumption 
baskets 𝐶  and 𝐶 . Price indexes are expressed in terms of the local currency, and 
corresponding foreign currency price indexes are denoted by an asterisk; e.g., 𝑝∗ (𝑧) is the 
foreign currency price of a differentiated domestic brand. 𝑃  and 𝑃  are defined as 
 
𝑃 = 𝑛 ∫ (𝑝 (𝑧)) 𝑑𝑧 , 
 
𝑃 = (1 − 𝑛) ∫ (𝑝 (𝑧)) 𝑑𝑧 . 
 
The overall domestic price index is 
 
𝑃 = 𝑛𝛼(𝑃 ) + (1 − 𝑛𝛼)(𝑃 (𝜏)) . 
 
The corresponding foreign indexes are defined in an analogous way. 
 
The budget constraint of the domestic household is given by  
 
𝐷 = (1 + 𝑖 )𝐷 + 𝑤 𝑙 (𝑧) − 𝑃 𝐶 + 𝜋 − 𝑃 𝑇 ,   (2) 
 
where 𝐷  is domestic nominal bonds held at the end of period t (bonds pay one domestic 
currency period t+1), 𝑖  is the nominal interest rate on bonds between t-1 and t, 𝑤  is the 
nominal wage, 𝜋  is nominal dividends (profits) of domestic firms, and 𝑇  is lump-sum taxes. 
The only internationally traded asset is the domestic bond. The global asset-market clearing 
condition implies that 𝑛𝐷 + (1 − 𝑛)𝐷∗ = 0. 
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The foreign economy is similar to the domestic one, except for the fact that the foreign bond 
(F*), denominated in the foreign currency, is not traded internationally. The net supply of 
foreign bonds is zero, because the foreign country has only the representative household. The 
budget constraint of the foreign household is  
 
∗
+ 𝐹∗ = (1 + 𝑖 )
∗
+ (1 + 𝑖∗)𝐹∗ + 𝑤∗𝑙∗(𝑧) − 𝑃∗𝐶∗ + 𝜋∗ + 𝑃∗𝑇∗. 
 
where 𝑆  is the nominal exchange rate, defined as the price of the foreign currency expressed 
in the domestic currency. Consequently, an increase in this is an exchange rate depreciation of 
the domestic currency.  
 
In order to ensure the stationarity of the model, we follow Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003) 
and assume that net foreign debt increases the domestic interest rate. This is done by including 
a risk premium that forces external debt in the long term to return to the initial (zero) level. 
The interest parity condition with risk premium is given by 
 
(1 + 𝑖 ) = (1 + 𝑖∗) + 𝜓(exp(𝐷 ) − 1), 
 
where 𝜓(exp(𝐷 ) − 1)is the risk premium. 
 
The representative domestic household’s optimality conditions are 
 
1=𝛽(1 + 𝑖 ) ,     (3) 
 
𝑙 (𝑧) = .     (4) 
 
Equation (3) implies that households smooth consumption intertemporally. Equation (4) 
governs the optimal labor supply. The labor supply is an increasing function of the real wage 
and a decreasing function of private consumption. 
 
2.2 Monetary and Fiscal Policy  
The government budget constraint in per-capita terms can be expressed as 
 
𝑇 = 𝐺 + 𝐺 ,    (5) 
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where 𝐺 denotes public investment spending. We use non-distortionary taxes since we wish 
to isolate the effects of interest on the spending side of fiscal policy. 
 
Both types of public spending follow an AR (1) process 
 
𝐺 = ρ 𝐺 + 𝜀 , 
 
where i = I, C, ρ ∊ [0,1] and 𝜀  is a zero mean white-noise process representing an unexpected 
change in public spending. Percentage changes from the initial steady state (denoted by the 
subscript zero) are denoted by hats (for example: 𝑥 = 𝑑𝑥 /𝑥 ). Variables whose initial value 
is zero, such as initial bond holdings, are normalized by the initial level of GDP. 
 
The central bank adjust the nominal interest rate according to a log-linear Taylor rule with 
interest rate smoothing 
 
𝚤̂ = (1 − 𝜇 )𝜇 ∆𝑃 + 𝜇 𝚤̂ , 
 
where coefficients 𝜇  and 𝜇  are non-negative and Δ is the first difference operator. If the 
economy was at the zero lower bound, welfare multipliers could be somewhat different. 
However, Rendhal (2016) has already analyzed the welfare multiplier of fiscal policy in a 
liquidity trap. In addition, the effects of a public investment shock in the current version of the 
model are substantially in line with the empirical evidence. 
 
2.3 Supply Side: Firms 
Iwata (2013) emphasizes that it is customary in the literature (including Basu and Kollmann 
2013, Bom and Ligthart 2014, Iwata 2013, Rioja 1999, and Sims and Wolff 2018) to assume 
that firms face constant returns to scale in the private factors of production and increasing 
returns to scale in all factors due to the positive externality of public capital. As in Basu and 
Kollmann (2013), we assume the simplest version of the production function with public 
capital. All firms produce differentiated goods with the production function  
 
𝑦 (𝑧) = 𝑙 (𝑧)(𝐾 )∅,    (6) 
 
where 𝑦 (𝑧) is the output of the representative firm 𝑍, 𝑙 (𝑧) is the labor input, 𝐾  is the public 
capital stock, and ∅ is the output elasticity of public capital. The omission of private capital 
makes the model simpler and more transparent and allows us derive a simple equation that 
describes private productivity in terms of the key parameters of the model. The empirical result 
of the IMF (2014) is that public investment does not crowd private investment out or in, so that 
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this omission may not have significant implications for the welfare multiplier of public 
investment. 
 
Prichett (2000) criticizes the standard versions of the accumulation of public capital where 
every dollar of public investment spending creates valuable public capital always and 
everywhere. Several empirical studies support the view that there are notable inefficiencies in 
public investment (Caselli 2005, Dabla-Norris et al. 2012, Gupta et al. 2014, IMF 2015). 
Following Prichett (2000), we assume that only a fraction of the actual accounting cost of 
public investment translates into the value of public capital. The accumulation of public capital 
is given by 
 
𝐾 = (1 − 𝛿)𝐾 + 𝜁𝐺  
 
where δ is the depreciation rate of public capital and 𝜁 (0< 𝜁 ≤1) is public investment 
efficiency. 𝜁 is in a way isomorphic to the marginal efficiency of investment of Justiniano et 
al. (2011), which they define as the process where (private) investment is transformed into 
(private) capital to be used in production. The existing theoretical business-cycle literature with 
public capital assumes that 𝜁 = 1, which implies the perfect efficiency of public investment. 
The steady state (SS) public capital is 𝐾 = 𝜁𝐺 𝛿⁄ . 
 
Equation (6) means that private productivity, denoted by 𝐴 , can be defined as 𝐴 = (𝐾 )∅. 
We can write it in terms of investment by iterating the public capital accumulation equation 
backwards: 𝐴 = [∑ (1 − 𝛿) 𝜁𝐺 ]∅. We can illustrate the intuition behind the main 
results by taking log of it to get 
 
𝑙𝑛𝐴 = ∅[𝑙𝑛 ∑ (1 − 𝛿) 𝜁𝐺 ].   (7) 
 
Equation (7) illustrates that private productivity, for a given level of public investment, is 
higher, (i) the bigger is the output elasticity of public capital (∅), (ii) the bigger is the efficiency 
of public investment (𝜁), and (iii) the smaller is the depreciation rate (𝛿). On the other hand, it 
shows that it is hard to specify the distinction between ∅ and 𝜁 as a contribution. 
 
The domestic firm maximizes its profits  
 
𝜋 (𝑧) = 𝑝 (𝑧)𝑦 (𝑧) − 𝑤 𝑙 (𝑧),   (8) 
 









∗ (1 − 𝑛)𝛼
∗(𝐶∗ + 𝐺∗ ), (9)
    
 
where 𝐺  is aggregate public spending (𝐺 = 𝐺 + 𝐺 ). Using equations (6) and (8), domestic 
profits can be expressed as  
 









∗ (1 − 𝑛)𝛼
∗(𝐶∗ + 𝐺∗ )  . (10) 
 
 
Under the flexible price solution of our model, the domestic firm would maximize equation 




.    (11) 
 
This expresses the notion that under flexible prices the price of the representative good is a 
constant mark-up, determined by within-country substitutability, over the marginal cost. 
However, we introduce nominal rigidities following Calvo (1983). Each firm can reset its 
prices with a probability of 1 − 𝛾 in any given period, independently of the time elapsed since 





𝑉 (𝑧) = ∑ 𝛾 Ϛ , 𝜋 (𝑧), 
 








where 𝑄 = 𝑛𝛼(𝐶 + 𝐺 ) + ∗
∗
∗ (1 − 𝑛)𝛼
∗(𝐶∗ + 𝐺∗ ). 
 
A convenient way of looking at the solution is to log-linearize it as follows 
 
?̂? (𝑧) = 𝛽𝛾?̂? (𝑧) + (1 − 𝛽𝛾)(𝑤 − ∅𝐾 ). 
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This shows that the change in the optimal price is a weighted average of the changes in current 
and future marginal costs, and that an increase in the public capital stock reduces the optimal 
price. 
 
2.4 Consolidated Budget Constraint  
The consolidated budget constraint of the domestic economy can be derived by plugging 
equations (5) and (8) into equation (2), as follows2 
 
𝐷 − (1 + 𝑖 )𝐷 = 𝑝 (𝑧)𝑦 (𝑧) − 𝑃 𝐶 − 𝑃 𝐺 − 𝑃 𝐺 . (12) 
 
We define the current account as the change in net foreign assets (following Obstfeld and 
Rogoff 1995) 
 
 C𝐴 = 𝐷 − 𝐷 = 𝑖 𝐷 + 𝑝 (𝑧)𝑦 (𝑧) − 𝑃 𝐶 − 𝑃 𝐺 − 𝑃 𝐺 . 
 
The current account is the sum of the service account (interest income) and the trade balance 
account, defined as the difference between the value of domestic output and the sum of private 
and public consumption and public investment. 
 
2.5 Initial Steady State 
We log-linearize the model around a symmetric steady state where initial net foreign assets are 
zero (𝐷 = 0). The consolidated budget constraint of the domestic economy (12) implies 𝑦 =





.    (13) 
 
3 PARAMETERIZATION 
We analyze the output and welfare multipliers of fiscal policy in advanced and developing 
economies, which may differ in many aspects. We assume, however, that they differ only in 
                                                 
2 The consolidated budget constraint for the foreign economy, which takes into account the market-clearing 
condition for domestic bonds and that the net supply of the foreign bond is zero, is 
− (1 + 𝑖 ) = 𝑝∗ (𝑧)𝑦∗(𝑧) − 𝑃∗𝐶∗ − 𝑃∗𝐺∗ − 𝑃∗𝐺∗ . 
. 
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two aspects. Developing economies have a lower public investment efficiency, consistent with 
the empirical evidence of the IMF (2015) and a lower productivity of public capital, to be able 
to match the empirically observed output multiplier of public investment in developing 
economies. The parameterization of the model is typically chosen to match the features of 
advanced economies, notably the U.S., the euro area and Japan. 
 
The two countries are of equal size (n=0.5). We set the discount factor 𝛽 at 0.995, as in Sims 
and Wolff (2018). Since we interpret our periods as quarters, this is equivalent to a 2% annual 
real interest rate. The within-country substitutability parameter (θ) is set it at 11, as in Sims 
and Wolff (2018). This implies a 10 percent price markup over the marginal cost in the steady 
state. Cross-country substitutability (𝜌) is set at 1.5, a commonly used value in international 
macroeconomics and consistent with the estimate by Dong (2012). Based on existing evidence 
and surveys (Keane and Rogerson 2012 and Chetty et al. 2013), the Frisch elasticity of labor 
supply (ν) is set at 0.7. The Calvo parameter (γ) is set at 0.5. This value is widely used in New 
Keynesian models and implies an average delay of two periods (six months) between price 
adjustments, consistent with the evidence of Bils and Klenow (2004). 
 
We set the home bias parameter such that the import to GDP ratio is realistic. We set α at 1.68 
and 𝛼∗ = (1 − 𝑛𝛼)/𝑛 = 0.32, so that the import to GDP ratio (1 − 𝑛𝛼 in the home country) 
is 16% in both countries, which corresponds to the observed ratio in recent years in the U.S., 
and Japan, and the Euro area (World Bank 2018 and Coenen 2013). 
 
The risk premium in the UIP (ψ) is set at 0.004, based on the findings of Bergin (2006). A net 
external debt of 10 percent of GDP increases the domestic interest rate by four basis points 
relative to the foreign country. The Taylor rule coefficients are set as 𝜇 = 0.79 and 𝜇 = 1.5, 
following Clarida et al. (2000) and Taylor (1993). 
 
According to the IMF (2014), the average public investment to GDP ratio in a group of 34 
advanced economies in 2000-2011 was 3.3% and in a group of 154 emerging and developing 
economies 8.2%. As discussed, since the parameterization of the model is typically chosen to 
match the features of advanced economies, the ratio of public investment to GDP is set at 0.03. 
According to the World Bank (2018), the average ratio of public consumption to GDP in high 
income countries in 2000-2011 was 18% and in low and middle countries 14%. The ratio of 
public consumption to GDP is set at 18%. Consequently, the ratio of private consumption to 




Table 1. Parameterization of the Model 
Parameter Baseline value Description Source 
β 0.995 Discount factor Sims and Wolff (2018) 
n 0.5 Relative size of the 
domestic economy 
 
𝜃 11 Within-country 
substitutability 
Basu and Fernald (1997) 
& Sims and Wolff (2018) 
𝜌 1.5 Cross-country 
substitutability 
Dong (2012) 
ν 0.7 Frisch elasticity of labor 
supply 
Keane and Rogerson 
(2012) & Chetty et al 
(2013) 
γ 0.5 Calvo parameter Bils and Klenow (2004) 
α 1.68 Home bias parameter Coenen (2013) & World 
Bank (2018) 
α* 0.32 Home bias parameter Coenen (2013) & World 
Bank (2018) 
ψ 0.004 Risk premium in UIP Bergin (2006) 
𝜇  0.79 Interest rate smoothing Clarida et al. (2000) 
𝜇  1.5 Coefficient for inflation in 
the monetary policy rule 
Taylor (1993) 
𝐺 𝑦⁄  0.03 Public investment to GDP 
ratio 
IMF (2014) 
𝐺 𝑦⁄  0.18 Public consumption to 
GDP ratio 
World Bank (2018) 
𝜌 , 𝜌  0.75 Persistency of public 
spending shocks 
Iwata (2013) 
𝜗 0.4 Weight of public 
consumption 
Song et al. (2012) 
δ 0.0125 Depreciation rate of public 
capital 
IMF (2014) 
ϕ 0.083 Output elasticity of public 
capital 
Bom and Ligthart (2013) 
 
𝜁 0.87 Efficiency of public 




𝜁 0.57 Efficiency of public 
investment in developing 
economies 
Dabla-Norris (2012), 





The persistency of public investment and consumption shocks is set at 0.75 (𝜌 = 0.75, i=I, 
C), based on the findings of Iwata (2013). The sizes of shocks (𝜀 , 𝜀 ) are set at 1 percent of 
initial GDP. The weight of public consumption to relative private consumption (𝜗) is a very 
poorly identified parameter. The larger is 𝜗, the higher the utility weight households place on 
public consumption. We set it at 0.4, following Song et al. (2012)). The welfare multiplier of 
public consumption is very sensitive to it and we explain how the multiplier depends on it in 
section 4.1. 
 
Equation (7) shows that the results are sensitive to the output elasticity of public capital (ϕ), 
the public capital depreciation rate (δ), and the efficiency of public investment (𝜁). Given the 
quite wide range of estimates for the output elasticity of public capital, we rely on the meta-
analysis carried out by Bom and Ligthart (2013), who use a sample of 578 estimates collected 
from 68 studies, concluding that the short-term output elasticity of public capital supplied at 
the central government level is 0.083. Accordingly, we set the benchmark value at 0.083. In 
the sensitivity analysis, we vary it within the range of 0.02 to 0.1. 
 
Rioja (1999), Bom and Ligthart (2014) and Sims and Wolff (2018) set a 10% annual 
depreciation rate of public capital. Bom and Ligthart (2014) and Sims and Wolff (2018) use 
this value without any explanation. Rioja (1999, 396) argues that “depreciation rates of public 
and private capital are set to be equal given that there are no known studies to the author that 
estimate them separately”. The annual 10% depreciation rate is typically chosen to match the 
depreciation rate of private capital. Today, the foundations for setting the annual 10% 
depreciation rate for public capital, however, seems weak. Kamps (2006) calculates that the 
annual depreciation rate of public capital has increased from 2.5% to 4% in the U.S. He argues 
that this rise may reflect an increasing weight of assets with relatively short life spans and a 
shortening of assets’ life spans. He argues that these developments are characteristic of ICT-
related assets. Gupta et al. (2014) build a public capital stock series that takes into account the 
efficiency of public investment using the annual depreciation rate of 2.5% for low-income 
countries and 4.3% for middle-income countries. 
 
The IMF (2015, 47) argues that depreciation rates are “likely to increase with income assuming 
that the share of assets with a shorter life spans (such as technology assets) rises with income 
levels.” It follows the logic of Kamps (2006) and Gupta et al. (2014) and sets the time-varying 
depreciation rates of capital in the estimation of public investment efficiency and the public 
capital stock. It sets the depreciation rate of public capital at 2.5% for low-income countries, 
3.5% for middle-income countries and 4.6% for high-income countries in 2013, while the 
private capital depreciation rate in high-income countries was 10%. In fact, the numbers for 
high-income countries are based on empirical evidence from the U.S., Australia and Canada. 
These numbers indicate that we should set the annual depreciation rate of public capital well 
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below 10%. In the baseline parameterization, we set the quarterly depreciation rate at 1.25% 
(δ = 0.0125), which implies a 5% annual depreciation rate. 
 
The main innovation of the paper—relative to macro models exploring the welfare effects of 
public investment—is the incomplete efficiency of public investment. Therefore, the choice of 
𝜁 is worthy of a comment. Dabla-Norris et al. (2012) construct a public investment efficiency 
index that can be used in macro models as a proxy for 𝜁. They find that the average index is 
0.42 in a group of 71 low and middle income countries. They do, however, find a large range 
of estimates (0.07–0.88) and argue that “implications should also be examined for the wide 
range of [𝜁] values” (Dabla-Norris et al. 2012, 258). Gupta et al. (2014) construct a public 
capital stock series that takes into account the efficiency of public investment using the same 
71 countries. They find that only about half of public investment spending translates into public 
capital as their average estimate of 𝜁 is 0.51. 
 
The IMF (2015) develops a public investment efficiency indicator that evaluates the 
relationship between the stock of public capital and indicators of the quality and coverage of 
public infrastructure assets. Countries with the highest levels of public infrastructure coverage 
and quality for given levels of the public capital stock and per-capita income form the basis of 
an efficiency frontier and get an index score of 1. Countries are given an index score of 0 and 
1, based on their distance to the frontier relative to the peer group’s best performers. The greater 
the distance from the frontier, the less efficient the country’s public investment, and lower its 
index score. A physical indication, which uses data on the volume of economic and social 
infrastructure, measures of the coverage of physical output of public investment. A survey-
based indicator based on the World Economic Forum’s survey on the impression of the quality 
of public infrastructure services measures of the quality of public infrastructure assets. The 
hybrid indicator, which joins the indicators, is 0.87 in advanced economies, 0.73 in emerging 
economics, and 0.6 in low income developing countries. 
 
We believe that the IMF’s (2015) public investment efficiency index is the best estimate for 𝜁 
for advanced economies and set it at 0.87. We set it at 0.57 for developing economies, which 
is the average of the estimates of Dabla-Norris (2012), Gupta et al. (2014), and the IMF (2015) 
for emerging economics and low and middle income countries. We analyze the sensitivity of 
the key results varying 𝜁 from 0.57 to 1.3 
 
4 OUTPUT AND WELFARE MULTIPLIERS OF PUBLIC SPENDING 
In this section, we present the results on the output and welfare multipliers of fiscal stimulus. 
The cumulative multiplier (CM) is defined as the cumulative change in output over the 
                                                 
3 We simulate the model using the algorithm developed by McCallum (2001) and Klein (2000) 
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The net present value fiscal multiplier (NPVM) is the sum of output over a certain time horizon 
(we use 2,000 periods) discounted at the steady state interest rate, and divided by public 







We calculate not only the net present value output multiplier but also the net present value 
welfare multiplier. In calculating the welfare multiplier, we follow Engler and Tervala (2018), 
Rendhal (2016) and Sims and Wolff (2018), who define it as the one period consumption 
equivalent change in the present discounted value of flow utility for a one unit (dollar) change 
in public spending. First, we measure the welfare effect of fiscal policy as a percentage of 
initial consumption that the household is willing to pay for fiscal expansion to be as well off 
in the fiscal expansion case as in the initial equilibrium (see Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe 2007). 
 
Let {𝐶 , 𝐺 , 𝑙 (𝑧)}  be the private and public consumption and labor supply paths 
without fiscal expansion (WFE). The associated net present value (NPV) of welfare is given 
by  
 
𝑈 = ∑ 𝛽 log(𝐶 ) −
( ( )) /
/
+ 𝑣𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐺 , . 
 
We define 𝜆  as the NPV of the welfare effect of a fiscal expansion (FE) relative to a case 
without fiscal expansion. It is measured as the fraction of initial private consumption that the 
domestic household is willing to pay for domestic fiscal expansion. If 𝑈  denotes the net 
present value of welfare in the fiscal expansion case, then 
 
𝑈 = ∑ 𝛽 log (1 + 𝜆 )𝐶 −
( ( )) /
/
+ 𝜗𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐺 ,   
𝑈 = log(1 − 𝜆 ) + 𝑈  . 
 
We can solve for 𝜆 , and express the welfare effect of a fiscal expansion as the percentage 
(rather than as a fraction) of consumption, as follows  
 
𝜆% = 100 × [exp(1 − 𝛽) (𝑈 − 𝑈 ) − 1].  (14) 
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Taking a first-order Taylor expansion of the utility function (1), we have  
 
𝑑𝑈 = 𝑈 − 𝑈 = ∑ 𝛽 𝑑𝑈 = ∑ 𝛽 (𝐶 − (𝑙 (𝑧)) 𝑙 (𝑧) + 𝑣𝜗 , . 
 
Welfare without fiscal expansion would be the same as in the initial steady state. We derive 
the NPV of the welfare effect of fiscal expansion as the percentage of initial consumption by 
substituting the above equation into (14) 
 
𝜆% = 100 × exp(1 − 𝛽) (∑ 𝛽 (𝐶 −
(𝑙 (𝑧)) 𝑙 (𝑧) + 𝜗𝐺 , .   (15) 
 
Finally, we divide (15) by public spending discounted the same way to calculate the (domestic) 
welfare multiplier (𝑀 ) of fiscal policy:  
 
𝑀 =
× ( ) ∑ ( ( ( )) ( ) ,
∑
 . (16) 
 
This welfare multiplier is the consumption equivalent change in welfare for a one dollar change 
in public spending. If the welfare multiplier is 0.5, one dollar increase in public spending yields 
a welfare improvement that corresponds 0.5 dollars increase in domestic private consumption.  
 
Our open economy framework enables the analysis of the welfare multiplier for the world 
economy, while Sims and Wolff (2018) determine welfare multipliers in the closed economy. 
The world welfare multiplier is the sum of the consumption equivalent changes in welfare for 







In figure 1 we plot the value of fiscal expansion (not the welfare multiplier), measured by the 
percentage of initial consumption, that the household in willing to play for the fiscal expansion 
in period t: 
 
𝜆% = 100 × exp(1 − 𝛽) (𝐶 − (𝑙 (𝑧)) l (z) + 𝜗logG , ]) − 1 . 
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4.1 Public Consumption 
Figure 1 shows the impulse responses of selected variables to a one percent of GDP increase 
in domestic public spending. The solid lines show the effects of a public consumption shock 
while the dashed lines show the effects of an investment shock in advanced economies. The 
terms of trade are defined as the ratio of the price of domestic exports to the price of imports. 
Generally speaking, variables are expressed in percentage deviations from the initial steady 
state. However, the change in the trade balance, whose initial value is zero, is expressed as 
deviations from initial GDP, inflation is expressed in percentage points in annual terms, and 
welfare is expressed in the percentage of initial consumption. 
 
Figure 1. Effects of Fiscal Expansion. Source: All tables/figures, excluding Table 1, are 
based on authors’ calculations. 
 
A public consumption shock increases domestic output. This is due to both to the increase in 
aggregate demand and to the wealth effect that pushes domestic households to work more when 
domestic taxes are increased. Table 2 shows that the cumulative output multipliers of public 
consumption over four and five years are 0.42-0.43. This is consistent with the empirical 
evidence provided by Gechert and Rannenberg (2014). In a meta-analysis of fiscal multipliers 
based on 98 empirical studies with more than 1800 observations, they find that the cumulative 
output multiplier of public consumption is 0.43. Estimates for developing economies are rare. 
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Kraay (2014) finds that the one-year spending multiplier is 0.4 in a group of 102 developing 
countries. Our result is fully consistent with this. 
 
The domestic trade balance initially deteriorates because of the import component of the 
increased public spending. In the medium term, however, the fall in domestic consumption 
resulting from higher taxes, together with the improvement in the domestic terms of trade, 
imply an improvement in the domestic trade balance. Such hump-shaped behavior of the trade 
balance is consistent with the empirical evidence provided by Iwata (2013). The dynamics of 
other variables, including a short-lived increase in inflation due to the demand shock and a 
depreciation of the domestic real exchange rate in the medium term, are also consistent with 
Iwata (2013). We observe an increase in foreign output, due to both the increased demand in 
foreign goods stemming from the domestic fiscal shock and the short-term appreciation of the 
domestic exchange rate. However, given the substantial level of home bias in public spending, 
this spillover effect is weak. 
 
























Consumption 0.44 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.48 -0.35 -0.33 
Investment 
(Advanced E) 




0.48 0.52 0.60 0.66 0.76 1.8 0.039 0.11 
 
Welfare effects are the main focus of our paper. Two contrasting effects on domestic welfare 
follow a domestic public spending shock. The increase in labor supply and the fall in private 
consumption due to higher taxes and the terms of trade imply a fall in domestic welfare. Public 
consumption yields utility, so an increase in public consumption increases welfare. Figure 1(i) 
shows that the first effect dominates, because the weight of public consumption in private 
utility is small. As shown in Table 2, the welfare multiplier for domestic households is -0.35, 
meaning that they are willing to pay 0.35 dollars to avoid a one dollar rise in public 
consumption. 
 
The first paper that analyzes the welfare multiplier of public consumption is Rendahl (2016). 
He analyzes fiscal policy in a liquidity trap using a model with hysteresis-like movements in 
unemployment. He finds that for a fiscal expansion of long duration the welfare multiplier is 
positive, while for a more temporary fiscal expansion it becomes negative. In particular, if the 
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duration of the fiscal shock is short, the welfare multiplier is in the -0.4 to -0.2 range, which is 
very close to what we find. In our model, the welfare multiplier in general is smaller because 
the liquidity trap environment (Woodford 2011) and hysteresis (Engler and Tervala 2018) 
increases the effectiveness of fiscal policy. 
 
Sims and Wolff (2018) argue that the sign of the welfare multiplier of public consumption 
depends heavily on the utility weight of public consumption, which is very poorly identified. 
They emphasize that the multipliers vary across states, which we cannot do since we use a 
linear approximation. However, they find that the welfare multiplier of public consumption in 
consumption equivalent terms is -0.17 around the non-stochastic steady state. Our welfare 
multiplier is more negative (-0.35) than that of Sims and Wolff (-0.17). A key reason is likely 
to be that they assume complementarity between private and public consumption. This 
increases the output multiplier of fiscal policy (Ganelli and Tervala 2009) and renders fiscal 
policy more beneficial. Sims and Wolff (2018) argue that the negative welfare multipliers 
imply that the initial amount of public consumption is higher than households would prefer. 
Our model would yield a positive output multiplier if public spending was set lower than the 
optimal level. For instance, if we set the weight of public consumption (𝜗) at 1.5, the welfare 
would be 0.2. 
 
The welfare spillover effect on the foreign economy is positive. The improvement in the 
foreign terms of trade implies that foreign consumption rises by more than foreign output, 
which brings about a welfare improvement because it means that foreign households can 
increase their consumption with a proportionately lower increase in labor supply. The positive 
spillover effect implies that the world welfare multiplier is more negative (-0.35) than that of 
the domestic economy (-0.33). 
 
4.2 Public Investment 
4.2.1 Advanced Economies 
 
In this section, we focus on the effects of a one percent of GDP increase in public investment 
in the case where the parameterization of the model matches the features of advanced 
economies. We discuss how the macroeconomic effects of our exercise on the main variables, 
especially the output multipliers, are substantially in line with the empirical evidence. This 
lends credibility to our welfare analysis, because it means that our study looks at the welfare 
impact of this policy in a reasonably realistic framework. 
 
In the case of a public investment shock, we have both a temporary demand effect and a supply-
side effect, because the productive capacity of firms increases with a higher capital stock. The 
second effect was missing in the previous case of a public consumption shock. Consequently, 
a public investment push increases medium-term output (Figure 1(a)), relative to the public 
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consumption case. As can be seen in Table 2, the cumulative output multiplier increases with 
time, as a higher capital stock expands productive capacity. The time pattern of the output 
response is consistent with the empirical evidence of Iwata (2013), who shows that the short-
term effect of public investment is higher than the medium-term effect. Table 3 shows the 
cumulative output multipliers of the IMF’s (2014) empirical study and our findings. Our output 
multipliers are almost identical to the empirical findings of the IMF (2014). Our results are 
also in line with the meta-analysis carried out by Gechert and Rannenberg (2014), who find 
that the cumulative fiscal multiplier of public investment is 1.4. The introduction of the 
inefficiency of public investment improves the model’s ability to match the empirical estimates 
of the IMF (2014) on the cumulative output multipliers. They would exceed the empirical 
estimates without inefficiency. 
 
Table 3. Output Multipliers. CM = cumulative output multiplier, PRs = periods. 
 CM, 4 PRs CM, 8 PRs CM, 12 PRs CM,16 PRs CM, 20 PRs 
IMF (2014) 0.5 0.7 1 1.3 1.5 
Our model 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.5 
 
Coenen et al. (2012) study the output multipliers of public investment using the seven DSGE 
models of policy-making institutions. The average first-year multiplier for public investment 
spending is 1.5. In our model, the output multiplier of public investment is much smaller (0.6) 
and in line with the empirical evidence of the IMF (2014), according to which the first-year 
output multiplier is only 0.5. 
 
Table 2 shows that the NPV of the output multiplier (4.6) is much higher than the cumulative 
multipliers. This result arises mainly because, after four years, public investment spending has 
in essence returned to zero, but output remains high owing to the increase in the productive 
capacity generated by higher public capital. While very few papers have studied the long-term 
effects of public investment, our results point to public investment having a stronger output 
effect in the long term, compared with the existing literature. In the model by Bom and Ligthart 
(2014), the long-term output multiplier of a permanent increase in public investment is 2.3. 
The key reason for the difference is that we use a lower deprecation rate. However, our results 
are consistent with the conclusion by Bom and Ligthart (2013) that public capital is more 
productive in the long term than in the short term.  
 
As Figure 1 shows, domestic consumption falls in the short term. This caused by the increase 
in the taxation needed to finance higher public investment. The public investment shock 
deteriorates the terms of trade in the short term, which tends to increase private consumption. 
However, the tax effect dominates and consumption falls in the short term. However, the tax 
effect fades away and, as in the empirical analysis by Iwata (2013), a public investment shock 
increases private consumption. In addition, an investment shock brings about an initial 
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appreciation of the real exchange rate, followed by a depreciation, while the short-term interest 
rate (not shown in our graph) increases because of the reaction of the central bank following 
the increase in inflation, consistent with the empirical evidence offered by Iwata (2013). 
 
The trade balance effect is in line with that observed in the case of a public consumption shock. 
Even though domestic private consumption goes down in the short term for the reason 
discussed above, we observe a deterioration in the overall domestic trade balance in the short 
term, due to higher public investment spending. In the medium term, the trade balance effect 
is reversed. This is consistent with Iwata’s (2013) empirical evidence, who finds that the trade 
deficit first worsens and then improves following a public investment shock. 
 
Overall, the macroeconomic effects of a public investment shock are in line with the empirical 
evidence. This lends credibility to our welfare results, which are the main innovation of this 
paper, to which we now turn. We see in Table 2 that our model points to substantial welfare 
gains from a public investment shock. The welfare multiplier of public investment is 1.4, 
meaning that domestic households would be willing to pay 1.4 dollars for a one dollar increase 
in domestic public investment. The intuition is that the gains in productivity linked to enhanced 
public capital imply an increase in private consumption without an identical increase in labor 
supply, which improves welfare. 
 
Figure 1(j) shows that the welfare spillover effect is positive after some time. The improvement 
in the foreign terms of trade implies that foreign consumption rises by more than the foreign 
labor supply and output. The positive welfare spillover implies that the world welfare 
multiplier is larger (1.6) than the domestic welfare multiplier (1.4). Domestic and foreign 
households combined would be willing to pay 1.6 dollars for one dollar increase in domestic 
public investment. 
 
Bom and Ligthart (2014) find that the welfare effect of a permanent increase in public 
investment is positive in the long term if the output elasticity of public capital exceeds the 
public investment to GDP ratio (3%). Sims and Wolff (2018) examine the welfare multipliers 
of public investment using a closed-economy model in which parameters are set to match the 
features of the U.S. economy. Their welfare multiplier is positive in the benchmark 
parameterization, in which the output elasticity of public capital is 0.05, while the multiplier is 
negative when it is 0.02. Since these studies show that the welfare results are sensitive to the 
output elasticity of public capital, we conduct a sensitivity analysis to see how our results 
depend on it. The main innovation of the paper—relative to Bom and Ligthart (2014) and Sims 
and Wolff (2018)—is incomplete public investment efficiency and we analyze how the welfare 
multipliers also depend on the efficiency of public investment. 
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The results of this sensitivity analysis are reported in Table 4. First, the higher the fraction of 
public investment spending that translates into the public capital stock, the higher the welfare 
multiplier. Second, the larger the output elasticity of public capital, the higher the welfare 
multiplier. High public capital productivity is not a sufficient condition for a positive welfare 
effect; the efficiency of public investment needs to be sufficiently high too. For countries with 
low public investment efficiency and productivity, an increase in public investment is not 
desirable from a welfare point of view. However, table 4 illustrates that—under plausible 
parameterization combinations for advanced economies—the welfare multiplier of public 
investment is positive. 
 
Table 4. Domestic Welfare and Output Multipliers 
(The cumulative output multiplier over 20 periods in parentheses). 
 𝜁 = 0.57 𝜁 = 0.73 𝜁 = 0.87 𝜁 = 1 
𝜙 = 0.02 -0.26 (0.6) -0.17 (0.6) -0.10 (0.7) -0.035 (0.7) 
𝜙 = 0.03 -0.11 (0.7) 0.015 (0.7) 0.13 (0.8) 0.23 (0.9) 
𝜙 = 0.04 0.039 (0.8) 0.21 (0.9) 0.35 (0.9) 0.49 (1.0) 
𝜙 = 0.05 0.19 (0.8) 0.40 (1.0) 0.57 (1.1) 0.76 (1.2) 
𝜙 = 0.083 0.69 (1.1) 1.0 (1.3) 1.36 (1.5) 1.66 (1.6) 
𝜙 = 0.1 0.94 (1.3) 1.4 (1.5) 1.8 (1.7) 2.1 (1.9) 
 
It is worth emphasizing that Bom and Ligthart (2014) and Sims and Wolff (2018) use the 10% 
annual depreciation rate of public capital. In our model, the welfare multiplier is virtually to 
zero when 𝜙 = 0.03, δ = 0.025 and 𝜁 = 1, a finding in line with Bom and Ligthart (2014). 
Sims and Wolff (2018) discover that the welfare multiplier of public investment is 0.33 around 
the non-stochastic steady state when 𝜙 = 0.05. In the comparable version (δ = 0.025, 𝜙 =
0.05 and 𝜁 = 1), our multiplier is 0.21. The open economy dimension of our model is the key 
here. In the closed-economy model of Sims and Wolff (2018), the (domestic) welfare 
multiplier takes into account all welfare effects. In our open economy model, a fraction of the 
welfare gains of public investment leaks abroad. A fiscal expansion increases the demand for 
foreign goods, increasing foreign income. In addition, the improvement in the foreign terms of 
trade means that foreign consumption increases by more than the foreign employment and 
output. In our model, the world welfare multiplier in the case of δ = 0.025, 𝜙 = 0.05 and 𝜁 =
1 is 0.3. Since this finding is consistent with Sims and Wolff (2018), their welfare multipliers 
may overestimate the welfare gains of public investment in the domestic economy for two 
reasons. First, they assume full public investment efficiency. Second, their multipliers do not 
take into account that a fraction of the welfare gains of public investment leaks abroad. On the 
other hand, Sims and Wolff’s (2018) welfare multipliers may underestimate the welfare 
benefits of public investment because they set the productivity of public capital at 5%, whereas 
the meta-analysis by Bom and Ligthart (2013) shows that it is roughly 8%. In addition, they 
set the annual depreciation rate at 10%, whereas according to the IMF (2015) it is 5%. 
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4.2.2 Developing Economies 
 
Next, we examine the effects of a one percent of GDP increase in public investment in the case 
where the parameterization of the model matches the features of developing economies. As 
mentioned, we set public investment efficiency at 0.57 for developing economies. What is the 
right value of the productivity of public investment in developing economies? The meta-
analysis of Bom and Ligthart (2013) uses 68 studies that estimate the productivity of public 
investment, but only one (Dessus and Herrera 2000) focuses on developing countries. 
According to Bom and Ligthart (2013), the relative output elasticity of public capital in Dessus 
and Herrera (2000) is 56% of that of the average of all estimates. Since Bom and Ligthart 
(2013) find an output elasticity of public capital of 0.083, it may be almost 0.05 in developing 
economies. However, this value would imply that we could not match the empirically observed 
output multiplier of public investment in developing countries. If we set the productivity of 
public capital at 0.03, we can match them, as shown below. Our choice for the output elasticity 
of public capital in developing countries is a compromise and we set it at 0.04. 
 
The IMF (2014) highlights that data limitation is a serious issue in the empirical estimation of 
the macroeconomic effects of public investment in developing economies. First, the IMF 
(2014) estimates a fiscal policy rule for public investment to obtain a series of exogenous 
shocks to public investment for a sample of 128 emerging and developing economies. Using 
this methodology, the cumulative output multiplier is 0.25 in the first year and 0.5 in the fifth 
year. Second, the IMF (2014) uses public investment implemented by official loan 
disbursement in a sample of 95 emerging and developing economies. Using this methodology, 
the cumulative output multiplier is 0.5 in the first year and 0.9 in the fifth year. The effects on 
output are much smaller, but more precisely estimated, using the first method. We believe that 
the averages of these estimates are the best ones and we set the productivity of public capital 
such that the output multiplier is close to 0.4 after one year and 0.7 after five years. 
 
Figure 2 shows the effects of a rise in domestic public investment spending. The dashed (solid) 
lines show the effects in developing (advanced) economies. Table 2 shows that the first-year 
output multiplier is only 0.5, which is almost identical to the average IMF findings. The output 
multiplier is 0.76 in the fifth year, which is almost identical to the average IMF estimate (0.7). 
This gives credibility to our analysis since we analyze the effects of public investment under a 
realistic parameterization. Introducing inefficiency enhances the model’s ability to match the 
empirically observed low output multipliers. Without it, the low output multipliers could not 
be matched without assuming an implausible low productivity of public capital (2%). 
 
Figure 2 shows that while the main variables move qualitatively pretty much the same way in 
developing economies, quantitative differences in domestic output and private consumption 
are substantial. Less public investment efficiency implies a smaller increase in public capital. 
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In addition, low output elasticity of public capital means a much smaller output effect on 
developing economies. The increase in the taxation needed to finance higher public investment 
is identical in developing and advanced economies. Thus the tax effect dominates much longer 
and a medium-term rise in private consumption is very much smaller than in advanced 
economies. 
 
Figure 2. Effects of Public Investment. 
 
Table 2 shows that the welfare multiplier of public investment in developing economies is 
0.039. Households are thus willing to pay only 0.039 dollars for a one dollar increase in public 
investment. The gains in productivity caused by enhanced public capital imply an increase in 
private consumption in the medium term. A public investment shock causes an increase in the 
labor supply, which reduces welfare. The welfare gain caused by a modest increase in private 
consumption offsets the welfare loss caused by an increase in the labor supply. 
 
As discussed earlier, low public investment efficiency and productivity imply a negative 
welfare multiplier. Table 4 shows that if the productivity of public capital is 0.03, the welfare 
multiplier is -0.11, because the welfare loss caused by a rise in the labor supply more than 
offsets the welfare gain caused by a rise in private consumption. In this case, the output 
multiplier after five years (0.7) is fully consistent with the average IMF estimate (0.7). In our 
view, it is fair to say that under plausible parameter values for developing economies, the 
welfare multiplier is may be just above zero or even negative. 
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Table 4 shows that when 𝜙 = 0.04 and public investment efficiency is 0.73, which is the IMF’s 
(2014) estimate for emerging economies, the welfare multiplier is 0.21. However, the 
cumulative output multiplier over 20 periods is higher (0.9) than the average IMF estimate 
(0.7). If the productivity of public capital is 0.083, as in advanced economies, the cumulative 
output multiplier over 20 periods is 1.1, which is higher than the average IMF estimate (0.7). 
In addition, the IMF’s (2014) estimate, using the fiscal policy rule methodology, was only 0.5. 
This suggests that the productivity of public capital in developing economies cannot be as high 
as 0.083 in general. However, the public investment implemented by official loan disbursement 
methodology implies than the effects on output are higher but rather imprecisely estimated. 
The IMF (2014, 101) argues that this “could simply reflect the wide variety of experiences 
with public investment in developing economies.” This may be due to huge differences in the 
efficiency and productivity of public investment. Some developing economies may have used 
public investment implemented by official loan disbursement so wisely that they have yielded 
nice welfare benefits. 
 
Table 4 suggests that the lower productivity of public capital is the most important factor for 
the lower welfare multiplier of public investment for developing countries. In the case where 
𝜙 = 0.083, the welfare multiplier of public investment drops from 1.36 to 0.69, when the 
efficiency of public investment is reduced from the baseline value for advanced economies 
(0.87) to the baseline value for developing economies (0.57). In the case where 𝜁 = 0.87, the 
welfare multiplier drops to 0.35, when the productivity of public capital is reduced from the 
baseline for advanced economies (8.3%) to the baseline for developing economies (4%). 
 
The IMF (2014) analyzes briefly the implications of low public investment efficiency in 
developing economies. This shows that in countries with high (low) investment efficiency, a 
deficit financed rise in public investment leads to significant (weak) growth effects and a 
decline (an increase) in the public debt to GDP ratio. It does not, however, analyze the output 
or welfare multipliers of fiscal policy. It is worth observing that it sets the output elasticity of 
public capital at 25%. In our view, the choice value of 0.25 is implausible. If the productivity 
of public capital is set at 25%, the cumulative output multiplier of public investments over 20 
periods is 2.5 in our model. This is more than three times higher than the average of the 
empirical estimates of the IMF (2014). 
 
The policy implications of public investment efficiency are disputed. On the one hand, low 
public investment efficiency has been seen as the key problem. Pritchett (2000) argues that in 
developing countries low efficiency is of first-order importance because public investment 
creates little capital and even where public capital could make a potentially large contribution 
to production, public investment spending has a low impact on economic performance. The 
IMF (2014) argues that if the efficiency of public investment is low, public investment leads 
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to very limited output gains. Thus the key priority in low efficiency countries should be to raise 
public investment efficiency. On the other hand, Berg et al. (2019) argue that the efficiency 
and scarcity of public capital are inversely related across countries and that—in growth 
theory—the productivity of public capital is higher in low-efficiency countries. They claim 
that both the efficiency and productivity of public investment need to be considered together 
in evaluating the consequences of a rise in public investment. In their view, recommendations 
against a public investment push in inefficient countries do not make sense because low-
efficiency countries reap at least an identical output gain from public investment. 
 
Our paper offers a novel view on this debate. First, the empirical evidence offered by the IMF 
(2014) shows that the output effect of public investment in advanced economies (1.5) is double 
that of developing economies (0.7). Second, the empirical evidence in the IMF (2015) shows 
that the efficiency of public investment is much higher in advanced economies than developing 
economies. In our DSGE model, these two empirical observations are impossible to reconcile 
without assuming smaller public capital productivity in developing countries. In practice, 
public investment efficiency and productivity are both likely to be lower in developing 
countries than in advanced economies; public investment efficiency and productivity may be 
inversely related across developing economies. However, the empirically observed weak 
output effects of public investment suggest that both the efficiency and productivity may be so 
low in developing economies that the welfare multiplier of public investment in developing 
economies is just above zero. Developing economies should be to raise both the efficiency and 
productivity of public investment. 
 
4.3 Sensitivity Analysis 
Table 5 shows the sensitivity of the main results to changes in parameter values. Row 1 
replicates the baseline result for developing economies. The second column shows the 
parameters used in the sensitivity analysis and the baseline parameterization is shown in 
parentheses. 
 
In row 2, the depreciation rate is doubled from the baseline value of 0.0125 to 0.025, which 
implies that the annual depreciation rate increases to 10%. The higher the depreciation rate, 
the smaller the supply-side effect of public investment in the medium and long term. Table 5 
shows that the welfare multiplier drops to -0.21. The main policy message is that public 
investment decisions should take into account the life span of public capital. 
 
The welfare multipliers may be sensitive to the value of within-country substitutability, 
because it affects the level of initial output and employment (equation 13). Row 3 (4) of Table 
5 shows that when within-country substitutability is 6 (21), implying a 20 (5) percent price 
markup, the domestic welfare multiplier is 0.061 (0.026). Hence, welfare multipliers are not 
sensitive to changes in it. 
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The effects of fiscal policy in DSGE models are sometimes sensitive to the Frisch elasticity of 
labor supply. In row 5, it is reduced from 0.7 to 0.5, while in row 7 it is increased to 2. The 
higher the Frisch elasticity, the stronger the output effect of an investment shock. However, 
the welfare multipliers are robust to changes in it. 
 
Table 5. Robustness Checks for Developing Economies. 




1 Baseline 0.8 0.039 
2 δ=0.025 (δ=0.0125) 0.7 -0.21 
3 θ=6 (θ=11) 0.8 0.061 
4 θ=21 (θ=11) 0.8 0.026 
5 ν=0.5 (ν=0.7) 0.7 0.048 
6 ν=2 (ν=0.7) 1.0 0.010 
7 α=1.44 (α=1.68) 0.7 -0.027 
8 𝜌=3 (𝜌=1.5) 0.8 0.083 
9 γ=0.0 (γ=0.5) 0.7 0.054 
10 γ=0.75 (γ=0.5) 0.8 0.029 
11 𝜌 =0.93 (0.75) 0.6 0.043 
12 𝐶 𝑦⁄ =0.8 (𝐶 𝑦⁄ = 
0.79) 
0.8 0.042 
13 n=0.01 (n=0.5) 0.8 0.049 
 
The open economy dimension is a key difference from Sims and Wolff (2018) and in our model 
a fraction of the welfare gain of public investment leaks abroad. The international welfare 
leakage depends on the degree of openness and cross-country substitutability. In row 7, the 
home bias parameters in both countries are changed such that the import to GDP ratio is 
increased from 16% to 28%, which is the world average (World Bank 2018). The more open 
the economy is, the smaller the welfare multiplier is. Actually, the welfare multiplier turns 
negative. However, the quantitative change is small. Cross-country substitutability governs 
how much changes in the international price ratio affect the relative demand for domestic and 
foreign goods. It also influences the size of the terms-of-trade change. This is relevant because 
the deterioration of the domestic terms of trade is the main reason why a substantial fraction 
of welfare effects leak abroad. In row 8, cross-country substitutability is doubled from 1.5 to 
3. We observe a small increase in the welfare multiplier. The international dimension is an 
important feature of the model, but the international welfare leakage is robust to small changes 
in the degree of openness and cross-country substitutability. 
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In row 9, the probability of not adjusting prices is reduced from 0.5 to 0, while in row 10 it is 
increased to 0.75. The more rigid the price, the stronger the fiscal policy demand effect, which 
drives up output in the short term. However, the welfare multiplier of fiscal policy is almost 
exclusively determined by the supply-side effect and price rigidities hardly change it. In row 
11, the persistence of the shock is increased from 0.75 to 0.93, the value used by Sims and 
Wolff (2018). While the absolute welfare effect of fiscal policy is obviously affected by the 
duration of the shock, the welfare multiplier is—in practice—unaffected, because it measures 
the welfare effect of a one dollar change in investment. 
 
The welfare multiplier may depend on the initial level of public investment. In our model, the 
initial level of employment (equation 13) affects the welfare multiplier (see equation 16). Since 
the public capital stock increases the real wage, households substitute leisure for labor. The 
income effect increases both consumption and leisure. The log utility for consumption implies 
that income and substitution effects for the labor supply cancel each other out in the steady 
state. The key is not only level of public investment and but also the level of public 
consumption as the initial level of employment depends on the output to private consumption 
ratio. Holding the proportion of public consumption spending constant while reducing the 
initial level of public investment by one percentage point relative to GDP implies that the 
welfare multiplier is a slightly higher. However, the welfare multiplier is virtually independent 
of the initial level of public investment, holding the productivity of public capital constant. We 
should keep in mind that decreasing returns to capital implies that an increase public in capital 
leads to a smaller increase in output as the level of public capital increases. This is taken into 
account in the model, as the welfare multiplier is very sensitive to the productivity of public 
capital, which should depend on the initial level of public capital. 
 
In row 14, we analyze the small-country case where the relative size of the home country is 
1% of the world economy. At the same time, we change the home bias parameter α such that 
the domestic import to GDP ratio remains at 16% and we adjust the foreign import to GDP 
ratio such that the per-capita level of output is identical across countries. We observe a very 
small change in the welfare multiplier, because even small countries affect their terms of trade 
under imperfect competition. Therefore, country size has a small effect on the welfare 
multiplier. 
 
In summary, our results suggest public investment increases welfare provided that public 
investment efficiency is sufficiently high, the lifespan of public capital is sufficiently long, and 
the productivity of public capital is sufficiently high. The model, however, lacks elements that 
may play an important role in the welfare implications of public investment. First, the fact that 
the relationship between private and public investment is disputed does not imply that private 
capital does not matter for the welfare effects of public investment. If there were a crowding 
out effect on private investment, the welfare multiplier of public investments would be smaller. 
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Second, the absence of distortionary taxes implies that we ignore a channel of fiscal policy, 
tax distortions which would reduce the welfare multiplier of public investment. However, the 
output multipliers of our model are in line with the empirical evidence which lends credibility 
to our analysis. 
 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
Empirical studies support the view that there are significant inefficiencies in public investment 
and this has not been taken into account in DSGE macroeconomics. We analyze the 
consequences of the incomplete efficiency of public investment for the output and welfare 
multiplier of fiscal policy in a DSGE model. We conclude that the welfare multiplier of public 
investment is positive only if the efficiency of public investment is sufficiently high, the 
depreciation rate of public capital is sufficiently low and the output elasticity of public capital 
is sufficiently high. In advanced economies, a public investment push is much more attractive 
than previously thought. Our welfare multiplier (1.4) is roughly four times that of Sims and 
Wolff (2018). Good public investment management, however, is needed to ensure a positive 
welfare multiplier of public investment. 
 
The welfare multiplier of public investment may be just above zero in developing economies 
and they should improve public investment management to enhance public investment 
efficiency and the productivity of public capital. The GDP of low and middle income countries 
was 29236 billion U.S. dollars in 2017 (World Bank 2018). Let us assume that their public 
investment to GDP ratio was 9%, which is the IMF’s (2014) estimate for emerging and 
developing countries at the beginning of the 2010s. In our model, the output multiplier at the 
10-year horizon for a quasi-permanent fiscal shock is roughly 0.2 units higher where public 
investment efficiency is 0.73 rather than the baseline value of 0.57. If all low and middle 
income countries improve the efficiency of public investment to the level of emerging 
economies, this will—holding the level of public investment constant—boost the annual GDP 
of low and middle income countries by 523 billion U.S. dollars in ten years. The IMF (2015) 
finds that improvements in public investment management can significantly enhance public 
investment efficiency and productivity and argues that governments should strengthen 
institutions that are responsible for the planning, allocation, and implementation of public 
investment. Our calculation shows that potential gains from an improvement in public 
investment efficiency alone may be considerable for developing economies. 
 
Views on the implications of public investment inefficiency for economic policy diverge. 
According to Pritchett (2000) and the IMF (2014), low efficiency is first-order importance in 
developing economies, because public investment spending creates little capital and 
consequently the output effect is small. In this view, the key priority is to raise efficiency. Berg 
et al. (2019), on the other hand, say that the productivity of public capital must be higher in 
low-efficiency countries, because in growth theory they are inversely related. They conclude 
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that the output effect in low-efficiency countries is at least as high as in high-efficiency 
countries. In this view, low efficiency is not even problematic. Our paper offers a fresh view. 
First, the IMF (2014) discovers that the output multiplier in developing economies (0.7) is 
roughly half that of advanced economies (1.5). Second, the IMF (2015) shows that efficiency 
is lower in developing economies. The empirical findings cannot be reconciled without 
assuming a higher productivity of public capital in advanced economies. In developing 
economies, efficiency and productivity may be both so low that the welfare multiplier of public 
investment is just above zero (0.039). If developing economies raised efficiency (productivity) 
to the level of advanced economics, the welfare multiplier would increase to 0.35 (0.69). We 
conclude than developing economies should improve not only the efficiency of public 
investment but also the productivity of public capital. Actually, the potential welfare gains of 
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